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COWEN, Circuit Judge. 
 
 Eric Davin appeals from the order of the district court 
granting summary judgment in favor of the United States 
Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation ("the FBI" 
or "the government") in a Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA") 
action.  In response to a FOIA request by Davin, the FBI 
submitted to the district court a Vaughn index that set forth 
coded justifications and corresponding explanations for its 
withholding of approximately 7,400 pages of information.  Because 
the Vaughn index submitted by the government did not sufficiently 
describe the information withheld, the district court did not 
have an adequate factual basis for determining whether the 
claimed exemptions applied to the individual documents. 
Accordingly, we will reverse the order of the district court and 
remand this matter for further determinations consistent with 
principles articulated in this opinion. 
 
I. 
 Davin is a graduate history student at the University 
of Pittsburgh in the field of labor history.  In order to 
complete his doctoral dissertation, in April 1986 Davin filed a 
FOIA request with the FBI seeking "a complete and thorough search 
of all filing systems and locations for all records . . . 
pertaining to David Lasser and The Workers Alliance of America." 
App. at 99 (emphasis in original).  The Workers Alliance of 
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America ("WAA") was a nationwide organization representing the 
interests of thousands of unemployed individuals during the 
1930's and 1940's.  For a time, the WAA was headed by David 
Lasser.  Because the WAA did not keep minutes of its meetings, 
there are no other archives of information on its activities. 
Lasser, who is now in his nineties, has provided the FBI with a 
letter authorizing release of his files. 
 The WAA was investigated by the FBI during the 1930's 
after the FBI received information that the organization was a 
front for the Communist Party of America.  The purpose of the 
investigation was to determine the extent of Communist influence, 
and the identity of WAA members who were members of the Communist 
Party at the time.  The FBI also investigated Lasser.  According 
to the FBI, Communists had captured positions of control within 
the WAA by 1936.  In 1940, Lasser resigned, claiming the WAA was 
a front organization for the Communist Party.   
 In response to Davin's request, the FBI located nine 
relevant files at either national headquarters or at the New York 
field office.  The FBI described the files as follows:  
FBIHQ main file, 61-7586, (45 sections) 
corresponds to NYFO main file, 100-3638, (6 
sections).  Both files pertain to an internal 
security investigation and were compiled for 
law enforcement purposes.  A 61 
classification is entitled "Treason or 
Misprision of Treason" and involves 
violations of Title 18, U.S.C., Sections 
2381, 2382, 2389, 2390, 756 and 757.  A 100 
classification is entitled "Domestic 
Security" and covers investigations by the 
FBI in the domestic security field; e.g., 
Smith Act violations.  The Attorney General 
declared WAA to be within the purview of 
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Executive Order 9835, and later Executive 
Order 10450.  The first serial is dated March 
5, 1936, and the last serial is dated October 
21, 1960. . . . 
FBIHQ main file, 124-2592 is a loyalty 
investigation of David Lasser consisting of 
two sections.  This classification covers 
security and loyalty investigations of 
personnel employed by or under consideration 
of employment with the European Recovery 
Program.  Investigation was conducted under 
Public Law 472, 80th Congress.  The first 
serial in this file is dated January 25, 
1949, and the last serial is dated October 
29, 1951. 
 
FBIHQ main file 121-413, (Loyalty of 
Government Employees) consisting of one 
section, pertains to a preliminary inquiry to 
ascertain if David Lasser was associated with 
the Communist Party or its front 
organizations.  Investigation of David Lasser 
under the provision of Executive Order 9835 . 
. . was instituted by the FBI on April 22, 
1948.  The first serial of this file is dated 
October 24, 1947, and the last serial is 
dated October 30, 1963. 
 
FBIHQ main file, 151-748 involves one 
section.  This classification covers 
referrals from the Office of Personnel 
Management where an allegation has been 
received regarding an applicant's loyalty to 
the U.S. Government.  The Agency for 
International Development had requested the 
FBI to conduct a full field investigation 
under the provisions of Public Law 298, The 
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended. 
David Lasser was interviewed by the FBI in 
1963 under the provisions of Executive Order 
10450 . . . .  The first serial is dated 
December 12, 1963, and the last serial in 
this file is dated January 29, 1976. 
 
FBIHQ main file, 126-706 consists of one 
section concerning a name check request on 
David Lasser for clearance for access to 
highly classified material by National 
Security Resources Board.  This 
classification covers background 
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investigation conducted on individuals who 
are to be assigned to duties under the 
International Development Program.  The first 
and last serials are dated November 14, 1950, 
and November 15, 1950, respectively. 
 
FBIHQ main file 65-66314, (Espionage) 
consisting of one section which contains 
documentation based on information received 
concerning the possibility that David Lasser 
could be some individual who could divert 
information to the detriment of the defense 
of the United States.  No investigation was 
conducted.  This file was opened on September 
22, 1960 and closed on September 27, 1960. 
 
FBIHQ main file, 47-13920 is a two-page file 
which contains information that a 
representative of WAA had made a claim that 
he had authority from the Federal Government 
to represent individuals in claims of various 
municipalities.  This file was opened and 
closed on February 19, 1938.  This 
classification is entitled "Impersonation" 
and covers violations of Title 18, U.S.C., 
Sections 912, 913, 915, and 916.   
 
FBIHQ main file, 61-10652 (two sections) was 
initially compiled to determine if David 
Lasser might act as an informant for the FBI 
or if he would be willing to supply details 
concerning Communist Party activities in WAA. 
The first serial of this file is dated June 
20, 1940, and the last document in the file 
is dated February 8, 1951. 
 
Declaration of Special Agent Robert A. Moran, App. at 60-63 
(footnotes omitted) [hereinafter all citations to the Appendix 
refer to the Moran declaration]. 
 
 The FBI asserts that its records relating to the WAA 
total approximately 9,200 pages and its records on David Lasser 
contain approximately 1,200 pages.  As of May 18, 1991, the FBI 
had released to Davin only 113 pages regarding the WAA and 150 
pages on Lasser. 
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 In April 1992, Davin filed a complaint for injunctive 
relief demanding the production of the documents.  Subsequently, 
pursuant to an agreement between the parties, Davin and the 
government submitted a joint motion to stay the case for 130 days 
to permit the government to submit a Vaughn index.1  This motion 
stipulated that the FBI had reviewed 6,889 documents pursuant to 
Davin's FOIA request, had released 2,970 pages to Davin, and 
claimed exemptions to the remaining 3,919 pages.  The joint 
motion further provided that the government would select 
approximately 500 documents (roughly every fourteenth or 
fifteenth page), compile a Vaughn index and submit it to the 
court with a motion for summary judgment. 
 Included in the government's subsequent motion for 
summary judgment was a declaration by FBI Special Agent Robert 
Moran.  The purpose of Moran's declaration was to provide the 
court and Davin with a description of the material being withheld 
and justifications for the government's assertions of FOIA 
exemptions to withhold certain information contained in the 
records.  The declaration consisted of correspondences concerning 
Davin's request, an explanation of the FBI's central records 
system and electronic surveillance index, a list of records 
pertaining to Davin's request, a sampling and definition of 
                                                           
1A Vaughn index is an index correlating each withheld document, 
or a portion thereof, with a specific exemption and relevant part 
of an agency's justification for nondisclosure. The Vaughn index 
is a tool designed to aid the court in determining whether the 
agency has properly withheld the information requested.  See 
Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Vaughn I), cert. 
denied, 415 U.S. 977, 94 S. Ct. 1564 (1974). 
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documents, a detailed explanation of the coded format used for 
justification of deleted material, and the justification for 
redacted materials. 
 A sampling of 500 pages was selected from the files. 
Each page was identified with a document number and indicated the 
file from which it came.  An explanation of the types of 
documents in the sampling was also supplied.  Portions of the 
documents were redacted.  Located in proximity to the redacted 
material was a series of letters and numbers which corresponded 
to specific FOIA exemptions.  In those instances where an entire 
page was redacted, justification code numbers for the withholding 
were substituted for the deleted page.   
 To determine the pertinent justification for deleted 
material on each processed document, the reader would refer to 
the document in question, note the code number adjacent to the 
deleted material and refer to the corresponding code categories. 
The memorandum then listed twenty-seven justification categories 
for withholding information, along with an explanation of the 
various categories. 
 Moran's declaration listed the FBI Main Files regarding 
Lasser and the WAA, but did not contain any factual description 
of the specific documents and portions of the documents withheld. 
Instead, Special Agent Moran offered generic explanations of the 
"justification categories" used to encode the Vaughn index.  No 
specific index was created to factually link the generic 
descriptions with the encoded deletions, and the explanations 
themselves did not refer to Lasser or the WAA or any other fact 
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connected with this action.  No attempt was made to provide an 
individual rationale for the withholding of specific information.
  
 The government asserted that of the 10,400 pages 
identified (9,200 on the WAA and 1,200 on Lasser), 2,970 had been 
released to Davin and that the remaining pages were being 
withheld under the following FOIA exemptions: (1) Category 
(b)(7)(C) Unwarranted Invasion of Personal Privacy; (2) Category 
(b)(7)(D) Confidential Source Material; (3) Category (b)(7)(E) 
Investigative Techniques and Procedures; and (4) Category (b)(2) 
Information related Solely to the Internal Personnel Rules and 
Practices of an Agency.   
 Following receipt of the declaration and exhibits, 
Davin filed a motion to compel production of documents for in 
camera review, arguing that the district court could not make an 
accurate determination of the validity of the redactions based 
upon the government's Vaughn index without review of the 
documents.  Davin asserted that the government had failed to 
provide any factual information describing the individual 
documents withheld and thus failed to demonstrate the 
applicability of the exemptions it claimed. 
 The district court ordered an evidentiary hearing in 
which Agent Moran testified about twenty-five of the 
approximately 7,400 documents that had been withheld.  These 
documents were selected by Davin from the "Treason or Misprision 
of Treason" file.  Twenty-two of these pages were blackened out 
in their entirety.  Agent Moran described the various categories 
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under which the documents were withheld, although he did not 
testify to the contents of the withheld documents themselves.   
 The district court held that Agent Moran's testimony, 
together with the Vaughn index, demonstrated with "reasonable 
specificity" why the documents were exempt from disclosure. 
Accordingly, the district court granted the government's motion 
for summary judgment and denied Davin's motion to compel in 





 A two-tiered test governs our review of an order of the 
district court granting summary judgment in proceedings seeking 
disclosure of information under FOIA.  We must "first decide 
whether the district court had an adequate factual basis for its 
determination."  McDonnell v. United States, 4 F.3d 1227, 1242 
(3d Cir. 1993) (citing Patterson by Patterson v. FBI, 893 F.2d 
595, 600 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 812, 111 S. Ct. 48 
(1990)).  This review is de novo and requires us to examine the 
affidavits below to determine "whether the agency's explanation 
was full and specific enough to afford the FOIA requester a 
meaningful opportunity to contest, and the district court an 
adequate foundation to review, the soundness of the withholding." 
Id. (quoting King v. Department of Justice, 830 F.2d 210, 217-18 
(D.C. Cir. 1987)).    
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 After reviewing the affidavits, "[i]f this Court 
concludes that the affidavits presented a sufficient factual 
basis for the district court's determination, it must then decide 
whether that determination was clearly erroneous."  Id. 
(citations omitted).  Factual findings are clearly erroneous "'if 
the findings are unsupported by substantial evidence, lack 
adequate evidentiary support in the record, are against the clear 
weight of the evidence or where the district court has 
misapprehended the weight of the evidence.'"  Id. (quoting Lame 
v. Department of Justice, 767 F.2d 66, 70 (3d Cir. 1985) (Lame 
II)). 
 The district court exercised jurisdiction in this 
matter pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (1988) and 28 U.S.C. 
§1331 (1988).  Our jurisdiction in this appeal rests on 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291 (1988). 
 
III. 
 Congress enacted the Freedom of Information Act, 5 
U.S.C. § 552, in order "to facilitate public access to Government 
documents."  United States Dep't of State v. Ray, 502 U.S. 164, 
173, 112 S. Ct. 541, 547 (1991).  Premised on the belief that "an 
informed electorate is vital to the proper operation of a 
democracy," FOIA was intended to create an expedient tool for 
disseminating information and holding the government accountable. 
Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Department of Energy, 644 F.2d 969, 
974 (3d Cir. 1981) (quoting S. Rep. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st 
Sess. 3 (1965)).  Consistent with this purpose, FOIA requires 
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governmental agencies to make promptly available any records 
requested unless the requested information is exempt from 
disclosure under one of the nine specific exemptions set forth in 
the FOIA statute itself.  5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1988 & Supp. V 
1993). 
 The Act creates a strong presumption in favor of 
disclosure, Department of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 361, 
96 S. Ct. 1595, 1599 (1976), and requires the district court to 
conduct a de novo review of a government agency's determination 
to withhold requested information.  5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B).  The 
agency has the burden of showing that a statutory exemption 
applies.  Id.  Moreover, any reasonably segregable portion of a 
record must be made available to the person requesting the 
record.  5 U.S.C. § 552(b). 
 The review of FOIA cases "is made difficult by the fact 
that the party seeking disclosure does not know the contents of 
the information sought and is, therefore, helpless to contradict 
the government's description of the information or effectively 
assist the trial judge."  Ferri v. Bell, 645 F.2d 1213, 1222 (3d 
Cir. 1981), modified, 671 F.2d 769 (3d Cir. 1992).  In order to 
"transform a potentially ineffective, inquisitorial proceeding 
against an agency that controls information into a meaningful 
adversarial process," the reviewing court may order the 
government to prepare a "Vaughn" index, identifying each document 
withheld, the statutory exemption claimed, and a particularized 
description of how each document withheld falls within a 
statutory exemption.  Coastal States, 644 F.2d at 984.  We have 
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adopted the principles and procedures outlined in Vaughn.  See, 
e.g., Ferri, 645 F.2d at 1222 & n.11. 
 The function of a Vaughn index and public affidavit is 
to establish a detailed factual basis for application of the 
claimed FOIA exemptions to each of the documents withheld.  In 
McDonnell v. United States, 4 F.3d 1227 (3d Cir. 1993), we 
explained: 
The significance of agency affidavits in a 
FOIA case cannot be underestimated . . . . 
Affidavits submitted by a governmental agency 
in justification for its exemption claims 
must therefore strive to correct, however 
imperfectly, the asymmetrical distribution of 
knowledge that characterizes FOIA litigation. 
The detailed public index which in Vaughn we 
required of withholding agencies is intended 
to do just that . . . .  Thus, when an agency 
seeks to withhold information, it must 
provide "a relatively detailed justification, 
specifically identifying the reasons why a 
particular exemption is relevant and 
correlating those claims with the particular 
part of a withheld document to which they 
apply." 
 
Id. at 1241 (quoting King, 830 F.2d at 218-19).  
 While there is no set formula for a Vaughn index, the 
hallmark test is "that the requester and the trial judge be able 
to derive from the index a clear explanation of why each document 
or portion of a document withheld is putatively exempt from 
disclosure."  Hinton v. Department of Justice, 844 F.2d 126, 129 
(3d Cir. 1988).  An agency is entitled to summary judgment when 
the agency's affidavits: 
describe the withheld information and the 
justification for withholding with reasonable 
specificity, demonstrating a logical 
connection between the information and the 
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claimed exemption . . ., and are not 
controverted by either contrary evidence in 
the record nor by evidence of agency bad 
faith. 
 
American Friends Serv. Comm. v. Department of Defense, 831 F.2d 
441, 444 (3d Cir. 1987) (quoting Abbotts v. Nuclear Regulatory 
Comm., 766 F.2d 604, 606 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (internal quotations 
and citations omitted)). 
 
A. 
 The fundamental inquiry in this case centers on whether 
the "categorical" method of indexing utilized by the government 
constitutes an adequate Vaughn index.  The government offered the 
declaration of Agent Moran as its Vaughn index.  The Moran 
declaration described the FBI's generalized FOIA procedures, 
including a summary of exemption "justification categories."  It 
set forth a detailed explanation of the justification categories 
used to redact the material included in the declaration.  Each 
justification category was denoted by a three or four letter 
code.  These codes appeared next to the redacted portions of the 
exhibits.  The government maintains that this declaration, in 
conjunction with Agent Moran's testimony, was a sufficiently 
adequate Vaughn index that permitted the district court to review 
all of the exemption claims advanced.   
 In its brief the government provided representative 
examples of the categorical indexing method it used.  For 
instance, the declaration explained that code "b7D-3" appearing 
next to the first redacted paragraph means that the information 
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was withheld because it was provided to the FBI by a source who 
had "received an express promise that it would be held in 
confidence" and contained information that could lead to the 
source's identity.  App. at 87.  The declaration further 
explained that disclosure had the potential of causing "great 
harm to the source," and of harming the FBI because of the 
"chilling effect on the activities and cooperation of other 
sources."  App. at 88.  As a second example, the government 
demonstrated that the list of names and addresses provided by the 
confidential source were withheld under category "b7C-6."  The 
declaration explained that this category means that the 
information was withheld to prevent an unwarranted invasion of 
privacy of the individuals named, since disclosure could 
"announce to the world that they were of investigative interest 
to the FBI and therefore permit derogatory inferences to be made 
therefrom."  App. at 79.  
 The government asserts that the use of a coded index 
system sufficiently fulfills the functions served by the classic 
Vaughn index, but in a more efficient and clear manner.  Davin 
argues that such a categorical approach, without the inclusion of 
specific factual information that correlates the claimed 
exemptions to the withheld documents, is not a sufficient Vaughn 
index.  We agree with Davin.   
 In McDonnell we held that in order for the FBI to 
fulfill its burden to establish that materials withheld are 
exempt from FOIA, "[t]he agency may meet this burden by filing 
affidavits describing the material withheld and detailing why it 
15 
fits within the claimed exemption."  McDonnell, 4 F.3d at 1241 
(emphasis added) (citing King, 830 F.2d at 217-18).  See also 
Lame v. United States Dep't of Justice, 654 F.2d 917, 928 (3d 
Cir. 1981) (Lame I) (the district court "should have had an 
explanation by the FBI of why in each case disclosure would 
result in embarrassment or harassment either to the individual 
interviewed or to third parties" (emphasis added)).  This 
precedent requires that the agency provide the "connective 
tissue" between the document, the deletion, the exemption and the 
explanation.  It is insufficient for the agency to simply cite 
categorical codes, and then provide a generic explanation of what 
the codes signify.  See King, 830 F.2d at 223-34 ("A withholding 
agency must describe each document or portion thereof withheld, 
and for each withholding it must discuss the consequences of 
disclosing the sought-after information. . . . Categorical 
description of redacted material coupled with categorical 
indication of anticipated consequences of disclosure is clearly 
inadequate." (emphasis in original)(footnote omitted)).   
 In the case at hand, the government's references to 
causing "great harm to the source," App. at 88, and to the 
possibility that disclosure could "announce to the world that 
they were of investigative interest to the FBI and therefore 
permit derogatory inferences to be made therefrom," App. at 79, 
are generic explanations broad enough to apply to any FOIA 
request.  They are not tied to the content of the specific 
redactions.  The justification codes and the explanations offered 
by the government lack an explanation of how the release of the 
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information would violate the privacy interests and pose 
potential risk to certain individuals.  Moreover, throughout his 
testimony, Agent Moran reiterated the broad categorical 
explanations recited in his declaration; he did not refer to 
specific facts.  Thus, Agent Moran's testimony sheds no new light 
on the government's reasons for nondisclosure. 
 While the use of the categorical method does not per se 
render a Vaughn index inadequate, an agency using justification 
codes must also include specific factual information concerning 
the documents withheld and correlate the claimed exemptions to 
the withheld documents.  Compare Keys v. United States Dep't of 
Justice, 830 F.2d 337, 350 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (upholding use of 
indexing system where "the affidavit placed each document into 
its historical and investigative context") with King, 830 F.2d at 
221 (similar coding system found wanting "because we are left 
with no contextual description for documents or substantial 
portions of documents withheld in their entirety") and Wiener v. 
FBI, 943 F.2d 972, 978-79 (9th Cir. 1991) ("boilerplate" 
explanations of coded index found inadequate since "[n]o effort 
is made to tailor the explanation to the specific document 
withheld"), cert. denied,    U.S.   , 112 S. Ct. 3013 (1992).  As 
the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit warned: "the goal of 
descriptive accuracy is not to be sacrificed to the niceties of a 
particular classification scheme."  King, 830 F.2d at 225.  Thus, 
"a coding system might be employed to indicate applicability of a 
given response to more than one segment of redacted material," 
but only "so long as the information supplied remains responsive 
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to each deleted segment without becoming categorical in tenor." 
Id. at 224 (emphasis added).   
 The Vaughn index provided by the government affords 
Davin little or no meaningful opportunity to argue for release of 
particular documents.  Indeed, the index provides no information 
about particular documents that might be useful in evaluating the 
propriety of the decision to withhold.  Because of the paucity of 
factual information related to the district court, the 
categorical justification codes could not provide a sufficient 
factual basis from which the district court could make its 
determination.  Accordingly, on the record before us, we hold 
that the district court could not fulfill its duty of ruling on 
the applicability of the claimed exemptions on the basis of the 
coded indexing system utilized by the government for its Vaughn 
index.    
 
B. 
 Davin further contends that the district court erred in 
failing to require the FBI to release all reasonably segregable 
portions of the sample documents.  Davin also maintains that the 
FBI is required under FOIA to provide him with all reasonably 
segregable material of all the 10,000 pages of material, not just 
the sampled material.  FOIA mandates that "[a]ny reasonable 
segregable portion of a record shall be provided to any person 
requesting such record after deletion of the portions which are 
exempt under this subsection."  5 U.S.C. § 552(b).  In 
determining segregability, courts must construe the exemptions 
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narrowly with the emphasis on disclosure.  Wightman v. Bureau of 
Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, 755 F.2d 979, 982 (1st Cir. 1985). 
The district court found that the FBI complied with its 
obligation. 
 It is the agency's burden to prove that the withheld 
portions are not segregable from the non-exempt material.  5 
U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B).  In the case at bar, the only evidence 
submitted by the government in support of its position was Agent 
Moran's conclusory statement that "[e]very effort has been made 
to provide the plaintiff with all reasonably segregable portions 
on [sic] the sampled material."  App. at 67.  Nowhere in Moran's 
declaration did he describe the process by which he determined 
that all reasonably segregable material of each of the withheld 
documents or portions of documents had been released.  Nor did 
the government provide a factual recitation of why certain 
materials are not reasonably segregable.   
 In its brief the government points, as an example, to 
Exhibits C-1 through C-7 which Agent Moran explained had been 
provided by a source under the express promise of 
confidentiality.  Government's Brief at 19-20.  According to the 
government, these documents contained a narrative in which a 
number of individuals involved with the WAA were named.  Exhibit 
C-1 bore two coded references: "b7C-6" and "b7D-3."  The 
government explained that category b7C-6 refers to the names of 
individuals who are of investigative interest to the FBI. 
According to Moran's declaration, the release of this information 
would constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy.  App. at 79-
19 
80.  Category b7D-3 indicates that the information was provided 
by an individual who had received an express promise of 
confidentiality.  App. at 87.  The government notes that a 
portion of C-8 was released because the identity of the 
confidential source could not be ascertained.   
 This representative example provided by the government 
itself, as an illustration of its proper efforts to provide Davin 
with all reasonably segregable information, in fact reflects the 
inadequacy of the government's efforts.  The government fails to 
indicate why the privacy interests at stake could not be 
protected simply by redacting particular identifying information. 
Without some further elaboration of the document's contents, 
Davin is unable to dispute the FBI's assertion that more 
information is not segregable.  Cf. Church of Scientology Int'l 
v. United States Dep't of Justice, 30 F.3d 224, 232 n.11 (1st 
Cir. 1994) (the government "needs to provide more than [an] 
unsupported conclusion to justify withholding the whole document. 
Is the document full of personal anecdotes, whose perspective 
would tend to reveal the declarant, thus supporting this 
conclusion?  Or does the document simply give one individual's 
description of the way the Church generally treats members, and 
thus arguably include material that could be segregated from the 
identifying information?").   
 The Moran declaration is comprised of assertions that 
documents were withheld because they contain the type of 
information generally protected by a particular exemption.  The 
statements regarding segregability are wholly conclusory, 
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providing no information that would enable Davin to evaluate the 
FBI's decisions to withhold.  On remand, the government must 
provide an adequate factual basis for the district court to 
determine whether Davin has been afforded all reasonably 
segregable information.2     
 Furthermore, the government must provide Davin with all 
reasonably segregable non-exempt information, not just the non-
exempt information found in the sampled documents.  The 
government maintains that it is only required to produce all 
reasonably segregable material from the sampled material.  It 
claims that because Davin agreed to a representative sampling of 
approximately 500 pages of the 6,689 documents selected he 
"should abide by his decision."  Government's Brief at 19.  
                                                           
2In addition to making findings without sufficient evidentiary 
support, the district court may have also erred in holding that 
more information was not reasonably segregable.  Although our 
scope of review on appeal is limited in this context, see 
McDonnell, 4 F.3d at 1242, it appears that certain information 
could be disclosed without jeopardizing possibly exempt 
information.  We note the colloquy between Agent Moran and 
counsel for Davin regarding the deletions of certain headings in 
the table of contents of a 200 page report.  Agent Moran 
testified that the deletions did not contain the name of a 
confidential source or confidential information, but rather the 
headings were redacted "because some of the information would 
indicate possibly a particular area of the country" from where 
the informant was operating and might, therefore, lead the 
requester back to the identity of a particular confidential 
source.  App. at 618.  We do not find it likely that a reference 
to a particular "area of the country" would lead to the identity 
of individuals who were given promises of confidentiality.  On 
remand, if after receiving a sufficient factual basis the court 
determines that certain information is exempt from disclosure, 
the district court should reexamine whether seemingly non-
identifying information such as this geographical information 
should also be withheld. 
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 The purpose of the Vaughn index is to help specify in a 
large document which portions of the document are disclosable and 
which are allegedly exempt.  Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820, 827 
(D.C. Cir. 1973) (Vaughn I), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 977, 94 S. 
Ct. 1564 (1974).  The indexing system "subdivide[s] the document 
under consideration into manageable parts," so that once the 
issues are focused, the reviewing court will have an easier task 
"rul[ing] on each element of the itemized list" than it would if 
the "agency were permitted to make a generalized argument in 
favor of exemption."  Id.   
 Courts have upheld the use of a representative sample, 
such as the sample stipulated to in this case.  See, e.g., 
Weisberg v. United States Dep't of Justice, 745 F.2d 1476, 1490 
(D.C. Cir. 1984); Vaughn v. Rosen, 523 F.2d 1136, 1140 (D.C. Cir. 
1975) (Vaughn II).  Nevertheless, any decision as to those 
documents is applicable to all of the documents at issue.  See 
Vaughn II, 523 F.2d at 1140 (noting that parties stipulated that 
any decision regarding the representative sample is applicable to 
all of the documents).  Accordingly, on remand the district court 
should reexamine the material in the sample, and any rulings it 
makes regarding those materials must then be applied to the 
entire body of the requested information.  The government is then 
obligated to provide Davin all the reasonably segregable material 
of all the 10,000 pages requested, based upon the district 
court's ruling. 
 These two holdings regarding general deficiencies in 
the government's Vaughn index alone require reversal of the 
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district court's order and remand for further fact finding. 
However, because on remand the district court may reach 
determinations of specific exemptions, we find it instructive to 
clarify certain contested issues and delineate the proper legal 
standards for future resolution. 
 
IV. 
 For the majority of the withheld information, the 
government has claimed exemptions under 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7), 
which applies to records or information compiled for law 
enforcement purposes.  Section 552(b)(7) provides, in relevant 
part, that the following is exempt from disclosure: 
records or information compiled for law 
enforcement purposes, but only to the extent 
that the production of such law enforcement 
records or information . . . (C) could 
reasonably be expected to constitute an 
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, (D) 
could reasonably be expected to disclose the 
identity of a confidential source, . . . 
which furnished information on a confidential 
basis, and, in the case of a record or 
information compiled by a criminal law 
enforcement authority in the course of a 
criminal investigation or by an agency 
conducting a lawful national security 
intelligence investigation, information 
furnished by a confidential source, (E) would 
disclose techniques and procedures for law 
enforcement investigations or prosecutions . 
. . if such disclosure could reasonably be 
expected to risk circumvention of the law . . 
. . 
 
5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).  Thus, in order to 
prevail on an Exemption 7 claim, the government must bear its 
burden of demonstrating for every record that: (1) the 
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information the FBI seeks to conceal was "compiled for law 
enforcement purposes," and (2) disclosure would produce one of 
the specified harms enumerated in the statute.  United States 
Dep't of Justice v. Landano,    U.S.   ,   , 113 S. Ct. 2014, 
2019 (1993); Federal Bureau of Investigation v. Abramson, 456 
U.S. 615, 622, 102 S. Ct. 2054, 2059-60 (1982).  
 
A. 
 In reviewing the government's withholding of records 
under any subsection of § 552(b)(7), the district court must 
first be satisfied that those materials qualify as "records or 
information compiled for law enforcement purposes."3  There is 
disagreement among the courts of appeals about how to make this 
threshold determination.  
                                                           
3While the focus of this case is upon documents compiled for 
putative criminal investigations, we note that "records or 
information compiled for law enforcement purposes" are not 
limited to records or information compiled for criminal 
investigations.  While criminal investigation is certainly one 
law enforcement purpose, there are also additional law 
enforcement purposes which are not necessarily criminal in 
nature.  Indeed, the statute itself treats both "criminal 
investigation[s]" and "national security intelligence 
investigation[s]" as subsets of law enforcement records in 
Exemption 7(D).  Thus, other agencies that have some law 
enforcement duties, such as the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission in investigating violations of Title VII, the Internal 
Revenue Service in enforcing the tax laws, and the National Labor 
Relations Board in conducting unfair labor practice proceedings, 
may also justify withholding information under Exemption 7. Note, 
however, that an agency whose principal function is not law 
enforcement bears the burden of proving that "the records it 
seeks to shelter under Exemption 7 were compiled for adjudicatory 
or enforcement purposes."  Stern v. FBI, 737 F.2d 84, 88 (D.C. 
Cir. 1984); see also infra at    [typescript at 26-28] 
(discussing Committee on Masonic Homes v. NLRB, 556 F.2d 214, 
218-19 (3d Cir. 1977)). 
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 The government suggests that we follow the courts who 
have adopted a per se rule, under which all records compiled by 
law enforcement agencies such as the FBI qualify as "records 
compiled for law enforcement purposes" pursuant to the (b)(7) 
exception.  See Jones v. Federal Bureau of Investigation, 41 F.3d 
238, 245-46 (6th Cir. 1994) (determining that the per se rule 
comports more fully with the policies Congress enacted in FOIA); 
Ferguson v. FBI, 957 F.2d 1059, 1070 (2d Cir. 1992) (district 
court should not engage in factual inquiry as to legitimacy of 
law enforcement purpose); Curran v. Department of Justice, 813 
F.2d 473, 475 (1st Cir. 1987) ("[T]he investigatory records of 
law enforcement agencies are inherently records compiled for 'law 
enforcement purposes' within the meaning of Exemption 7." 
(citation omitted)); Kuehnert v. FBI, 620 F.2d 662, 666 (8th Cir. 
1980) (a showing of law enforcement purpose of a particular 
investigation is not a precondition to FBI's invocation of 
Exemption 7).   
 In contrast, the Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit has rejected a per se rule, and adopted a two-
part test that must be satisfied in order for a law enforcement 
agency to pass the Exemption 7 threshold.  See Pratt v. Webster, 
673 F.2d 408 (D.C. Cir. 1982).  In Pratt, the court described the 
two "critical conditions" of what has been named the "rational 
nexus" rule:  
First, the agency's investigatory activities 
that give rise to the documents sought must 
be related to the enforcement of federal laws 
or to the maintenance of national security. 
To satisfy this requirement of a "nexus," the 
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agency should be able to identify a 
particular individual or a particular 
incident as the object of its investigation 
and the connection between that individual or 
incident and a possible security risk or 
violation of federal law.  The possible 
violation or security risk is necessary to 
establish that the agency acted within its 
principal function of law enforcement, rather 
than merely engaging in a general monitoring 
of private individuals' activities. . . . 
 
 Second, the nexus between the 
investigation and one of the agency's law 
enforcement duties must be based on 
information sufficient to support at least "a 
colorable claim" of its rationality. . . . 
Such an agency, in order to carry out its 
functions, often must act upon unverified 
tips and suspicions based upon mere tidbits 
of information.  A court, therefore, should 
be hesitant to second-guess a law enforcement 
agency's decision to investigate if there is 
a plausible basis for its decision.  Nor is 
it necessary for the investigation to lead to 
a criminal prosecution or other enforcement 
proceeding in order to satisfy the "law 
enforcement purpose" criterion. . . .   
 
 Thus, . . . [i]n order to pass the FOIA 
Exemption 7 threshold, such an agency must 
establish that its investigatory activities 
are realistically based on a legitimate 
concern that federal laws have been or may be 
violated or that national security may be 
breached.  Either of these concerns must have 
some plausible basis and have a rational 
connection to the object of the agency's 
investigation. 
 
Pratt, 673 F.2d at 420-21 (emphasis in the original) (citations 
and footnotes omitted).  See also King, 830 F.2d at 229 (FBI 
records are not deemed law enforcement records simply by virtue 
of the function that the FBI serves, but rather the two-prong 
Pratt test must be applied to determine the threshold showing 
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requisite).   The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has also 
adopted a "rational nexus" standard.  See, e.g., Wiener, 943 F.2d 
at 985 ("No withholding under any of the exemptions listed in 
section 552(b)(7) is valid unless the withholding agency 
establishes a '"rational nexus" between its law enforcement 
duties and the document for which Exemption 7 is claimed.'" 
(citations omitted)). 
 We have not directly ruled on what must be established 
in order to meet the threshold requirement.  We find, however, 
some guidance from our prior precedents.  In Committee on Masonic 
Homes v. NLRB, 556 F.2d 214 (3d Cir. 1977), an employer had 
requested from the National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB") all 
union authorization cards that had been submitted by the union as 
evidence of support.  The NLRB claimed that the cards were exempt 
from disclosure under Exemption 7.  The NLRB argued that it had 
an enforcement purpose -- enforcing the National Labor Relations 
Act -- for which the union authorization cards under question 
were compiled.  We held that under the circumstances of that 
case, there was no "law enforcement purpose" pursuant to 
Exemption 7, because "'law enforcement purposes' must relate to 
some type of formal proceedings, and one that is pending." Id. at 
219; see also Ferri, 645 F.2d at 1223 ("[T]he 'investigatory 
records' exemption is to be construed literally.  It contemplates 
files compiled with a specific, formal proceeding or 
investigation in mind.").   
 The precedential force of Masonic Homes can be 
questioned for two reasons.  First, we decided Masonic Homes 
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prior to the 1986 Amendment to FOIA that replaced the language 
"investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes," 
with the present language of § 552(b)(7), "records or information 
compiled for law enforcement purposes."  This amended language 
can appear to have been intended to broaden the exemption's 
reach.  We learn from the legislative history, however, that 
Congress' action was not intended to modify the threshold showing 
of law-enforcement purpose.  The report of the Senate Judiciary 
Committee on S. 774, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983), stated that 
the amendment "does not affect the threshold question of whether 
'records or information' withheld under (b)(7) were 'compiled for 
law enforcement purposes.'  This standard would still have to be 
satisfied in order to claim the protection of the (b)(7) 
exemption."  S. Rep. No. 221, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 23 (1983), 
reprinted in relevant part in, 132 Cong. Rec. H9466 (daily ed. 
Oct. 8, 1986); see King, 830 F.2d at 229 n.141 (providing 
detailed legislative history of the 1986 Amendment to Exemption 
7).  Accordingly, we can be assured that our holding in Masonic 
Homes has not been undercut by legislative fiat.  
 Second, because the withholding agency in Masonic Homes 
was the NLRB, it is unclear whether our conclusion that "law 
enforcement purposes" must relate to some type of formal 
enforcement proceeding, has an application to an agency whose 
principal function is criminal law enforcement.  See Pratt, 673 
F.2d at 421 n.33 ("We believe that the Third Circuit's conclusion 
that '"law enforcement purposes" must relate to some type of 
enforcement proceeding, and one that is pending,' has no 
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application to an agency whose principal function is criminal law 
enforcement.  Therefore, we also dismiss the First Circuit's 
concern . . . that the need to shield legitimate law enforcement 
efforts from harmful FOIA disclosures might lead to frivolous 
prosecutions." (citations omitted)).  
 While we are not bound to extend our holding in Masonic 
Homes to a law enforcement agency such as the FBI, at minimum, 
our statements in Masonic Homes indicate a rejection of a per se 
rule.  Accordingly, we must devise a test to apply to law 
enforcement agencies that requires the agency to sustain its 
burden of establishing the threshold element of Exemption 7.   
 We believe the preferable test is an adaptation of the 
two-prong "rational nexus" test articulated by the Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in Pratt.  Under 
this test, the government must identify a particular individual 
or incident as the object of the investigation and specify the 
connection of the individual or incident to a potential violation 
of law or security risk.  The agency must then demonstrate that 
this relationship is based upon information "sufficient to 
support at least a 'colorable claim' of its rationality."  Pratt, 
673 F.2d at 421.   
 The D.C. Circuit has explained that the threshold 
showing required by Pratt is an "objective" one, and "suffices to 
establish the exemption only if it is unrefuted by persuasive 
evidence that in fact another, nonqualifying reason prompted the 
investigation," such as where an investigation is conducted "for 
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purposes of harassment."  Shaw v. FBI, 749 F.2d 58, 63-64 (D.C. 
Cir. 1984).   
 In the present case, the FBI submitted a description of 
the nine files pertaining to Davin's FOIA request in the Moran 
declaration, as quoted above.  See supra at    [typescript at 3-
5].  The declaration clearly identifies David Lasser and the WAA 
as the targets of the investigations, thereby fulfilling the 
first prong of the Pratt test.  The declaration, however, plainly 
failed to specify the connection between Lasser and the WAA, and 
the possible security risk or violation of federal law.   
 As a preliminary matter, the declaration only contained 
a general description of the files and did not describe the nexus 
between each document and a particular investigation.  Indeed, 
the government failed even to identify the investigations to 
which each document in the nine FBI files pertained.   
 Furthermore, the declaration does little more than cite 
to the criminal statutes, executive orders, and public laws 
pursuant to which the investigations were undertaken, "presumably 
indicating that somewhere within the parameters of these general 
provisions were criminal acts that the FBI suspected [Lasser and 
the WAA] of committing."  King, 830 F.2d at 230.  While the 
second prong inquiry is "necessarily deferential" to the agency, 
Pratt, 673 F.2d at 421, we believe that the simple recitation of 
statutes, orders and public laws is an insufficient showing of a 
rational nexus to a legitimate law enforcement concern.  The FBI 
has failed to meet its burden in the district court because 
neither Agent Moran's declaration nor his testimony provide any 
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detail concerning the supposed law enforcement activities that 
generated each of the documents in the Vaughn index.  The FBI 
must come forward with additional evidence to support its claim 
of a law enforcement purpose. 
 In addition, we note that even the skeletal 
descriptions of the files provided by Agent Moran cast doubt on 
the government's assertion that the files were related to a law 
enforcement purpose: while the nine files cover investigations 
spanning over forty years, the government has not pointed to a 
single arrest, indictment or conviction.   
 We acknowledge that the Supreme Court has indicated 
there is no requirement for the compilation of information to be 
effected by a specific time.  See John Doe Agency v. John Doe 
Corp., 493 U.S. 146, 153, 110 S. Ct. 471, 476 (1989).  Nor do we 
require evidence of an actual indictment or conviction in order 
for the government to fulfill its burden of proving that its 
investigation pertained to a law enforcement purpose.  However, 
on the record before us, the government must allege additional 
specific facts that demonstrate "the agency was gathering 
information with the good faith belief that the subject may 
violate or has violated federal law," and was not "merely 
monitoring the subject for purposes unrelated to enforcement of 
the law."  Lamont v. Department of Justice, 475 F. Supp. 761, 773 
(S.D.N.Y. 1979) (citing, inter alia, Masonic Homes, 556 F.2d at 
219).  If the government's investigation did not ultimately 
result in any arrests, indictments or other proceedings, then the 
government may sustain its burden under § 552(b)(7) by explaining 
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why it decided not to follow through with the investigations. The 
Vaughn index in this case, however, provides Davin with no 
information whatsoever about the initiation, breadth or results 
of the investigations.  The paucity of information about these 
lengthy investigations casts doubt on the government's assertion 
that withheld documents pertain to law enforcement 
investigations, and has made impossible Davin's challenge to the 
government's claim. 
 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit was faced 
with similar circumstances in Wiener, where the FBI refused to 
release files to a historian concerning political investigations 
of John Lennon.  In that case, the FBI claimed Exemption 7, 
alleging that: 
John Lennon was under investigation for 
possible violations of the Civil Disobedience 
Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 231 (1988), and the 
Anti-Riot Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2101 (1988), 
because of his association with a radical 
group known as the Election Year Strategy 
Information Center (EYSIC). 
 
Wiener, 943 F.2d at 985-96.  The court rejected the FBI's claims, 
holding that: 
The Civil Disobedience Act and the Anti-Riot 
Act are very broad criminal statutes, 
prohibiting a wide variety of conduct. 
Citations to these statues do little to 
inform Wiener of the claimed law enforcement 
purpose underlying the investigation of John 
Lennon.  Without providing Wiener with 
further details of the kinds of criminal 
activity of which John Lennon was allegedly 
suspected, Wiener cannot effectively argue 
that the claimed law enforcement purpose was 
in effect a pretext. 
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Id. at 986. 
 The statutes that criminalize treason, misprision of 
treason, recruiting for service against the United States, and 
the other criminal activities that the FBI was "investigating" 
are no less broad than the Civil Disobedience Act or the Anti-
Riot Act.  The FBI's blanket references to these statutes do not 
adequately inform Davin of the claimed law enforcement purposes 
of the FBI investigation of the WAA and Lasser.  Accordingly, on 
remand, the government must provide additional facts regarding 
the law enforcement investigations implicated by each of the 
documents withheld under any (b)(7) exemption. 
 
B. 
 If, on remand, the district court concludes that the 
government has demonstrated a rational nexus between its law 
enforcement duties and the particular document or portions 
withheld, then the district court will reach the specific 
exemptions of subsections of § 552(b)(7).  The government asserts 
that information was exempt from disclosure under subsection 
(7)(C) Unwarranted Invasion of Personal Privacy, (7)(D) 
Confidential Source Material, and (7)(E) Investigative Techniques 
and Procedures.  We will address each exemption seriatim. 
 
1.  § 552(b)(7)(C) 
 Exemption 7(C) permits withholding of records or 
information compiled for law enforcement purposes to the extent 
that production "could reasonably be expected to constitute an 
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unwarranted invasion of personal privacy."  5 U.S.C. 
§552(b)(7)(C).  Agent Moran identified nine privacy interests 
that implicated Exemption 7(C): (1) the identities or identifiers 
of FBI personnel; (2) the names and identifying data of financial 
institution or commercial enterprise employees; (3) identities of 
non-FBI federal government employees; (4) names and identifying 
data of non-federal government law enforcement officers; (5) 
names and identifying data of state and local government 
employees; (6) names and identifying data pertaining to third 
parties who were of investigative interest; (7) names and 
identifying data for third parties who were merely mentioned; (8) 
file numbers related to third parties; and (9) names and 
identifying information of individuals who provided information 
to the FBI. 
 We set forth the standards for evaluating a 7(C) claim 
in Lame I, where we held: 
The Section 7(C) privacy exemption does not 
prohibit all disclosures which invade 
personal privacy, but only disclosures which 
entail an unwarranted invasion of personal 
privacy . . . .  "Exemption 7(C)'s protection 
of personal privacy is not absolute . . . . 
[T]he proper approach to [a] request under a 
privacy based exemption such as 7(C) is a de 
novo balancing test, weighing the privacy 
interest and the extent to which it is 
invaded on the one hand, against the public 
benefit that would result from disclosure, on 
the other." 
 
Lame I, 654 F.2d at 922-23 (quoting Ferri, 645 F.2d at 1217). See 
also McDonnell, 4 F.3d at 1254.  
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a. Privacy Interests  
 In United States Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. 
for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 109 S. Ct. 1468 (1989), 
the Supreme Court provided guidance on the proper understanding 
of "privacy interest."  Quoting from Webster's dictionary, the 
Court stated that information may be classified as "private" if 
it is "intended for or restricted to the use of a particular 
person or group or class of persons: not freely available to the 
public."  Id. at 763-64, 109 S. Ct. at 1477 (footnote omitted). 
We recognized in Landano v. United States Dep't of Justice, 956 
F.2d 422, 426 (3d Cir. 1992), vacated in part on other grounds 
and remanded,    U.S.   , 113 S. Ct. 2014 (1993), "that 
individuals involved in a criminal investigation -- including 
suspects, witnesses, interviewees, and investigators -- possess 
privacy interests, cognizable under Exemption 7(C), in not having 
their names revealed in connection with disclosure of the fact 
and subject matter of the investigation."  Id. at 426 (citation 
omitted).  Suspects, interviewees and witnesses have a privacy 
interest because disclosure may result in embarrassment or 
harassment.  Id.  Law enforcement personnel involved in a 
criminal investigation also have a cognizable privacy interest 
under FOIA.  Id. (citing Patterson, 893 F.2d at 601).   
 Accordingly, the individuals involved in the 
investigations of David Lasser and the WAA have a privacy 
interest in not having their identities disclosed.4  We note that 
                                                           
4We note again the colloquy between Agent Moran and counsel for 
Davin, in which Agent Moran concedes that certain information was 
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for some, the privacy interest may become diluted by the passage 
of time, though under certain circumstances the potential for 
embarrassment and harassment may also endure.  Id. at 427.  Thus, 
when balancing the private and public interests, the district 
court must determine the relative strength of an individual's 
privacy interest.  
 The government and Davin dispute whether death 
extinguishes an individual's privacy rights under FOIA, and if 
so, whether the government is required to determine if the 
individual is still alive.  The first issue has been settled by 
our holding in McDonnell, where we expressly announced that under 
§ 552(b)(7)(C), "[p]ersons who are deceased have no privacy 
interest in nondisclosure of their identities."  McDonnell, 4 
F.3d at 1257.  Furthermore, with regard to a claimed privacy 
exemption under § 552(b)(6), the exemption from disclosure of 
personnel and medical files, we directed the government to 
determine whether the subject of a FOIA request was deceased or 
living.  Id. at 1254.  While we recognize that the standard for 
evaluating privacy interests pursuant to Exemption 7(C) is 
somewhat broader that the standard for Exemption 6, see Reporters 
Committee, 489 U.S. at 756, 109 S. Ct. at 1473, we nonetheless do 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
redacted pursuant to Exemption 7(C) "[b]ecause some of the 
information would indicate possibly a particular area of the 
country" from where an informant was operating, which might lead 
the requester to the informant's identity.  App. at 618.  See 
supra note 2.  While the FBI may assert individuals' privacy 
interest in not having their identities disclosed, the privacy 
interest only extends to the individuals' names and street 
addresses, which need not be revealed, but not to cities, 
occupations, or other "identifiers." 
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not perceive legitimate grounds for distinguishing between (b)(6) 
and (b)(7)(C) on this issue.   
 The government voices a concern, however, that to 
require the FBI to determine whether all of the hundreds of 
individuals who are named in the files requested by Davin are 
alive "would place a great, if not intolerable burden, on the 
FBI."  Government Brief at 33.  We are mindful that the Supreme 
Court has recognized a congressional intent "to provide 
'"workable" rules' of FOIA disclosure."  Landano,    U.S. at   , 
113 S. Ct. at 2023 (citations omitted).  Accordingly, we hold 
that it is within the discretion of the district court to require 
an agency to demonstrate that the individuals upon whose behalf 
it claims the privacy exemption are, in fact, alive.  In 
exercising its discretion, the district court should consider 
such factors as the number of named individuals that must be 
investigated, and the age of the requested records.  If the 
number of individuals is not excessive, the agency could be 
required to determine whether the individuals are alive before 
asserting a privacy interest on their behalf.  However, after a 
sufficient passage of time -- such as in our case where the 
pertinent investigations began over sixty years ago (and in 
McDonnell where the investigation began over seventy years before 
the FOIA request) -- the probability of the named individuals 
remaining alive diminishes.  Under such circumstances, it would 
be unreasonable for the district court not to assume that many of 
the individuals named in the requested records have died, thereby 
negating a privacy interest unless proving otherwise. 
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b. Public Benefit 
 The Reporters Committee decision also guides us in 
identifying the relevant "public benefits" to be weighed against 
the asserted privacy interests.  The Supreme Court declared that: 
whether disclosure of a private document 
under Exemption 7(C) is warranted must turn 
on the nature of the requested document and 
its relationship to "the basic purpose of the 
Freedom of Information Act 'to open agency 
action to the light of public scrutiny'" 
Department of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 
[352], 372, 96 S. Ct. [1592], 1604 [(1976)], 
rather than on the particular purpose for 
which the document is being requested. 
Reporters Committee, 489 U.S. at 772, 109 S. Ct. at 1481. 
Accordingly, "[o]fficial information that sheds light on an 
agency's performance of its statutory duties falls squarely 
within that statutory purpose.  That purpose, however, is not 
fostered by disclosure of information about private citizens that 
is accumulated in various government files but that reveals 
little or nothing about an agency's own conduct."  Id. at 773, 
109 S. Ct. at 1481-82. 
 Davin asserts a strong public interest in illuminating 
the government's operations and exposing possible misconduct with 
regard with to the FBI's investigation of the WAA and Lasser.  We 
agree that the information requested by Davin appears to fall 
within the statutory purpose of FOIA in informing the citizenry 
about "what their government is up to."  Id. at 773, 109 S. Ct. 
at 1481 (quoting EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 80, 93 S. Ct. 827, 832 
(1973) (emphasis in original) (Douglas, J. dissenting)).  The 
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district court must determine, however, whether that purpose is 
fostered by disclosure of the identities of private citizens. 
 We are cognizant of the government's stated 
justification for withholding: (1) names and identifying data of 
non-federal law enforcement officers because "disclosure of their 
identities would inhibit the cooperation and exchange of 
information between law enforcement officials and the FBI, and 
would suppress a vital source of information that the FBI relies 
upon in order to pursue investigative interests against alleged 
criminals, suspects or subjects of investigations," App. at 78; 
and (2) identities of third parties who furnished information to 
the FBI because disclosure "would seriously impede the FBI's 
ability to gather future information."  App. at 81.  We held in 
McDonnell that "the Government's asserted interest in assuring 
future cooperation of witnesses with FBI investigations is not a 
valid reason for refusing to disclose information under Exemption 
7(C)."  McDonnell, 4 F.3d at 1256.  Accordingly, neither the FBI 
nor the district court may consider this factor in considering 
the public benefit of withholding the information. 
 
c. Balancing Private and Public Interests 
 Davin and the government disagree over how to perform 
the balancing between private and public interests.  Davin refers 
us to our decision in Lame I, where we emphasized that "[t]here 
can be no question that the 7(C) balancing test must be conducted 
with regard to each document, because the privacy interest and 
the interest of the public in disclosure may vary from document 
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to document.  Indeed, these interests may vary from portion to 
portion of an individual document."  Lame I, 654 F.2d at 923 
(footnote omitted).  In that case, we concluded that the FBI's 
refusal to disclose most of the witness interview transcripts 
could not be justified under Exemption 7(C), without explaining 
why the interviews would result in embarrassment or harassment 
either to the individuals interviewed or to third parties.  Id. 
at 928.   
 The government, in contrast, notes that the Supreme 
Court in Reporters Committee permitted agencies to exempt certain 
records categorically, as opposed to on a document-by-document 
basis.  In Reporters Committee, the Court stated that 
"categorical decisions may be appropriate and individual 
circumstances disregarded when a case fits into a genus in which 
the balance characteristically tips in one direction," 489 U.S. 
at 776, 109 S. Ct. at 1483, and concluded that "rap sheet" 
information is categorically exempt under § 522(b)(7)(C) because 
the release of such information always constitutes an unwarranted 
invasion of privacy.  Id. at 780, 109 S. Ct. at 1485.  
 While we believe that in the usual circumstance, an 
individual's privacy interest in not having his or her identity 
revealed in the context of a criminal or national security 
investigation overrides the public benefit, we will refrain from 
extending Reporters Committee to require a per se rule.  We 
similarly did not apply the categorical balancing approach in 
Landano, when we determined that FBI informants and agents had a 
privacy interest in not having their names disclosed in 
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connection with a criminal investigation, which outweighed the 
asserted public interest (not recognized by FOIA) in discovering 
wrongdoing by a state agency.  Landano, 956 F.2d at 430-31.   
 Accordingly, while we do not comment on the proper 
result of the balancing in this matter, we find it important to 
note that the government must conduct a document by document 
fact-specific balancing.  Agent Moran dispatched all of the 7(C) 
exemptions claimed in the 9,270 pages withheld by stating that in 
each instance where information was withheld: 
it was determined that individual privacy 
interests were not outweighed by any public 
interest.  When the documents at issue were 
reviewed . . . the passage of time and any 
effect on the third party privacy interests 
were considered.  It was determined that the 
privacy interests are stronger now than they 
were when the records were created.  To 
reveal names in the context of these records 
could reasonably be expected, due to the type 
of the investigation to put the lives of 
individuals in danger, cause embarrassment 
and humiliation, and would therefore, be an 
unwarranted invasion of privacy.  The 
disclosure of this information would not 
contribute significantly to the public's 
understanding of the operations or activities 
of the Government. 
 
App. at 75.  This explanation stands in stark contrast to 
McDonnell, where "[t]he Government set forth in an affidavit 
specific reasons why these persons have a privacy interest in 
nondisclosure of their identities."  McDonnell, 4 F.3d at 1255. 
Agent Moran's affidavit and testimony, and consequently, the 
district court's findings, did not link the (b)(7)(C) exemption 
to any of the individual documents.  On remand, the government 
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must provide the district court with a more detailed balancing 
effort. 
   
2. § 552(b)(7)(D) 
 Exemption 7(D) excepts from disclosure records or 
information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to 
the extent that the production: 
could reasonably be expected to disclose the 
identity of a confidential source, . . . 
which furnished information on a confidential 
basis, and, in the case of a record or 
information compiled by criminal law 
enforcement authority in the course of a 
criminal investigation or by an agency 
conducting a lawful national security 
intelligence investigation, information 
furnished by a confidential source. 
 
5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(D).  See also McDonnell, 4 F.3d at 1257. 
 The Supreme Court recently set forth the standards for 
withholding a document under Exemption 7(D) in Landano.  The 
Supreme Court explained that a source is considered a 
"confidential source" only "if the source `provided information 
under an express assurance of confidentiality or in circumstances 
from which such an assurance could reasonably be inferred.'" 
Landano,    U.S. at   , 113 S. Ct. at 2019-20 (quoting H.R. Conf. 
Rep. No. 1200, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1974), reprinted in 1974 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6285, 6291. 
 The government asserts that eight categories of 
information pertinent to Davin's request fall under Exemption 
7(D): (1) internal source symbols and code names assigned to 
confidential informants; (2) internal symbol numbers which 
42 
pertained to informants; (3) information provided by sources 
under an express promise of confidentiality; (4) temporary source 
symbols; (5) names and identifying data of third parties who 
provided information and were interviewed under an implied 
promise of confidentiality; (6) information supplied by 
institutions under an implied promise of confidentiality; (7) 
identities of non-federal law enforcement officers who provided 
information under an implied promise of confidentiality; and (8) 
information provided by local or state bureaus or agencies under 
an implied promise of confidentiality.  
 In Landano, the Supreme Court reemphasized that the 
government bears the burden of establishing that Exemption 7(D) 
applies.  Landano,    U.S. at   , 113 S. Ct. at 2019.  The Court 
embarked on its discussion of implied assurances of 
confidentiality after noting that the FBI in that case could not 
attempt to demonstrate that it made explicit promises of 
confidentiality, because "[t]hat sort of proof apparently often 
is not possible: The FBI does not have a policy of discussing 
confidentiality with every source, and when such discussions do 
occur, agents do not always document them."  Id. at   , 113 S. 
Ct. at 2020.  We glean from these remarks that if an agency 
attempts to withhold information under Exemption 7(D) by express 
assurances of confidentiality, the agency is required to come 
forward with probative evidence that the source did in fact 
receive an express grant of confidentiality.  Proof could take 
the form of declarations from the agents who extended the express 
grants of confidentiality, contemporaneous documents from the FBI 
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files reflecting the express grants of confidentiality, evidence 
of a consistent policy of expressly granting confidentiality to 
certain designated sources during the relevant time period, or 
other such evidence that comports with the Federal Rules of 
Evidence.   
 Rather than provide such proof, the government submits 
Agent Moran's declaration that asserts an alleged policy of the 
FBI to grant express assurances of confidentiality on a routine 
basis.5  The declaration fails to cite any written policy or 
                                                           
5Agent Moran stated in his declaration: 
 
Exemption (b)(7)(D) was asserted to withhold 
information received from a source under an 
express promise that it would be held in 
confidence, as well as information that could 
lead to the source's identity.  These sources 
are symbol numbered sources, code name 
sources, or individuals who specifically 
requested confidentiality . . . . 
As a matter of policy and practice, all 
symbol numbered informants or code names 
sources are given express assurances of 
confidentiality.  Illustrative of this 
express assurance of confidentiality is the 
manner in which such information is treated 
within the FBI.  The identities of such 
sources are not referred to by the true name 
in any FBI document which records the 
information they furnished.  The identities 
of these sources are known to very few FBI 
employees and are available only on a "need 
to know" basis.  These special precautions 
are needed because of the sensitive nature of 
the information being provided and harm that 
may befall these sources if their identities 
were revealed.  The manner in which the FBI 
actually obtains information from these 
sources is also demonstrative of the express 
assurance of confidentiality under which it 
is received.  The information is received 
only under conditions which guarantee the 
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provide any assurance that the alleged policy has been applied 
consistently over the years, and in this specific case.  There is 
no proof that these particular sources received express grants of 
confidentiality. 
 The government argues that we indicated in McDonnell 
that courts may rely upon agency declarations in determining 
whether a source has received an express assurance of 
confidentiality.  McDonnell, 4 F.3d at 1258.  In that case, we 
held that the district court did not err in adopting the 
magistrate judge's conclusion that the identity of and 
information provided by two specific sources were exempt from 
disclosure under (b)(7)(D) when the declaration stated one source 
was given express assurance of confidentiality and the other 
source was assigned a symbol source number and was never referred 
to by name in the file.  Id.  The government also cites Wiener, 
943 F.2d at 986, where the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
held that the FBI "need only establish the informant was told his 
name would be held in confidence." 
 These holdings do not support the government's 
assertion that it has sufficiently established that sources 
received express grants of confidentiality.  In McDonnell, the 
agent provided information regarding the circumstances 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
contact will not be jeopardized.  Derivative 
ensuing investigations attributable to a 
symbol numbered source have also been denied 
as disclosure of such would reveal the 
identity of the source. 
 
App. at 87-88. 
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surrounding the interviews in which express grants of 
confidentiality were given to the two specific sources in 
question.  McDonnell, 4 F.3d at 1257-58.6  No such specifics are 
provided in the Moran declaration in this case.  Furthermore, 
while the Wiener court required the FBI to "establish the 
informant was told his name would be held in confidence," the FBI 
has failed to do so in this case since the government did not 
present any evidence of its alleged policy or any evidence that 
an express grant of confidentiality was in fact given to any 
particular source.  
 On remand, the government, if it pursues an exception 
for express promises of confidentiality, must produce evidence of 
                                                           
6In McDonnell, we held that the district court did not err in 
adopting the magistrate judge's conclusion that the identity of a 
certain source was exempt from disclosure under Exemption 7(D), 
when, based on Agent Llewellyn's declaration, the magistrate 
judge "determined that the Government gave an express assurance 
of confidentiality to an informant named in the files . . . . The 
identity of this source was considered so sensitive that he or 
she was assigned a symbol source number and was never referred to 
by name in the file."  McDonnell, 4 F.3d at 1258.  While these 
statements may appear to imply that the FBI only pointed to its 
symbol source number policy to show that the sources received 
express grants of confidentiality, it is clear from reading 
McDonnell that the agent's declaration in fact provided detailed 
information regarding the circumstances of the express grants of 
confidentiality to the two specific sources involved in the 
investigation.  We wrote: "At oral argument on the parties' 
cross-motions for summary judgment, the magistrate judge ordered 
the FBI to submit a declaration regarding the circumstances 
surrounding the interviews of third parties who were members of 
the public.  This order was in response to two letters McDonnell 
has submitted from interviewees stating that they had not 
received either express or implied assurances of confidentiality 
when the FBI interviewed them."  Id. at 1257 (emphasis added). In 
response to this directive, the FBI submitted Agent Llewellyn's 
declaration, which presumably, fulfilled the magistrate judge's 
order. 
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its alleged policy and practice of giving all symbol numbered 
informants or code name sources express assurances of 
confidentiality, evidence that the policy was in force throughout 
the forty years spanned by the documents at issue, and evidence 
that the policy was applied to each of the separate 
investigations and in each case in which a document or portion 
has been withheld. 
 In addition to claiming that sources were given express 
promises of confidentiality, the government also asserts that 
some sources gave the FBI information under "an implied promise 
of confidentiality."  App. at 89.  In Landano, the Supreme Court 
explained that: 
the Government is not entitled to a 
presumption that a source is confidential 
within the meaning of Exemption 7(D) whenever 
the source provides information to the FBI in 
the course of a criminal investigation. 
 
 More narrowly defined circumstances 
however, can provide a basis for inferring 
confidentiality.  For example, when 
circumstances such as the nature of the crime 
investigated and the witness' relation to it 
support an inference of confidentiality, the 
Government is entitled to a presumption. 
 
Landano,    U.S. at   , 113 S. Ct. at 2024.  In that case, the 
Court noted, but did not decide, that the sources at issue who 
were witnesses to a gang-related shooting of a police officer, 
might well be presumed to have spoken to the FBI on condition of 
anonymity based on the circumstances under which they gave their 
information.  Id. at   , 113 S. Ct. at 2023. 
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 Moran indicated that all the persons who provided 
information under an implied promise of confidentiality were 
individuals who "were past or present members of the WAA; 
individuals who, through their employment, were in a position to 
provide detailed information; or private citizens who attended 
WAA meetings."  App. at 90.  In its brief, the government 
asserts: 
[T]he Alliance was suspected of being a 
Communist front and engaging in seditious 
activities.  Given the nature of the 
activities alleged, it could be presumed that 
the Alliance would take measures to shield 
them from law enforcement.  Under these 
circumstances, sources of insider information 
operated under an implied assurance of 
confidentiality.  The same holds true for 
individuals who reported matters discussed at 
Workers Alliance meetings.  The Alliance had 
various chapters or branches located 
throughout the country.  Individuals who 
attended meetings and then reported to the 
FBI also did so under an implicit grant of 
confidentiality.  These individuals were 
exposed to the risk of retaliation by 
reporting on Alliance business to the FBI, 
particularly if they were known to other 
members of the local branch.  In short, 
sources providing detailed information 
concerning the extent of Communist control of 
labor organization and possible treasonous 
activities of that organization would have 
been concerned "that exposure would bring 
harassment, ridicule or retaliation."  Keys 
v. Dep't of Justice, 830 F.2d [337,] 345-46 
[(D.C. Cir. 1987)]. 
 
Government's Brief at 41-42. 
 We do not believe that this recitation sufficiently 
describes circumstances that can provide a basis for inferring 
confidentiality.  The FBI has not offered evidence that any 
48 
member of the WAA engaged in acts of violence or harassment, or 
threatened to do so.  In light of the fact the government has 
access to documents concerning the WAA spanning a period of forty 
years, we assume that the government would be able to provide 
examples illustrating its contention that the sources allegedly 
were afraid of other WAA members.  The government's citation to 
Keys for the proposition that the sources sought implied 
assurances of confidentiality actually emphasizes the distinction 
between the circumstances of the two cases:  Keys involved a 
murder investigation by a foreign operative in which a source 
would have good reason to be afraid "lest he meet the same fate." 
Keys, 830 F.2d at 346. 
 The government has provided the court with generalized 
allegations that the WAA was suspected of "being a Communist 
front" and "engaging in seditious activities."  In attempting to 
prove that the sources received an implied promise of 
confidentiality, the FBI relies heavily on the presumption that 
people who speak to the FBI necessarily require confidentiality. 
App. at 90-91.  The Supreme Court rejected such a presumption in 
Landano.     U.S. at   , 113 S. Ct. at 2022.   
 Recently in McDonnell, we were faced with a requester 
seeking documents concerning information supplied by an alleged 
confidential source regarding involvement of "a suspicious or 
radical" member of the crew of a ship, who the FBI suspected was 
involved with a suspicious fire aboard the ship.  McDonnell, 4 
F.3d at 1258.  The government asserted that the information was 
exempt because these circumstances established that the source 
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gave his information under an implied promise of confidentiality. 
Id.  We held that the government did not meet it burden under 
Landano and remanded for further proceedings consistent with 
principles articulated by the Supreme Court.  In the case at 
hand, the FBI has not even shown that the persons being 
investigated were suspected of involvement in violent acts. 
Accordingly, as we held in McDonnell, 4 F.3d at 1262, on remand, 
the government must provide a further detailed factual recitation 
in order to sustain its burden of showing circumstances that 
provide a basis for inferring confidentiality. 
 As an added note, we mention the last clause of 
§552(b)(7)(D), which exempts from disclosure the information that 
a confidential source provides in a criminal or national security 
investigation.  While not directly before us on this appeal, we 
do not foreclose the possibility that the FBI could withhold more 
information than is justified to protect the identity of 
confidential sources, assuming, of course, the government 
adequately demonstrates that the information relates to a 
criminal or national security investigation. 
  
3. § 552(b)(7)(E) 
 The FBI has withheld documents and portions of 
documents under Exemption 7(E), which allows an agency to 
withhold records and information for law enforcement purposes 
that "would disclose techniques and procedures for law 
enforcement investigations or prosecutions."  5 U.S.C. 
§552(b)(7)(E).  Exemption 7(E) applies to law enforcement records 
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which, if disclosed, would risk circumvention of the law.  PHE, 
Inc. v. Department of Justice, 983 F.2d 248, 249-50 (D.C. Cir. 
1993).  This exemption, however, may not be asserted to withhold 
"routine techniques and procedures already well-known to the 
public, such as ballistic tests, fingerprinting, and other 
scientific tests commonly known."  Ferri, 645 F.2d at 1224 
(citing H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 1200, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1974), 
reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6285, 6291). 
 The government asserted this exemption, claiming the 
techniques utilized yielded valuable information, and the 
disclosure of certain information "would reveal the type of 
effective investigative techniques and the relative utility of 
these techniques could be diminished."  App. at 95.  The 
government argues that despite the fact that certain law 
enforcement techniques, such as the use of informants, may be 
well known to the public, disclosure is nevertheless not 
warranted where the circumstances surrounding the usefulness of 
these techniques is not well known.  According to the government, 
"the manner in which informants are identified, recruited, 
cultivated and handled by the FBI is not well-known," which is 
especially true where, as here, "the FBI is investigating an 
organization which is believed to be engaging in illegal 
activities and has taken measures to shield such subversive 
activities from law enforcement."  Government Brief at 43.  The 
government maintains that groups who are suspected of criminal 
wrongdoing today may be provided with information as to how the 
FBI recruits internal informants, which may aid the groups in 
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detecting informants currently operating within their ranks.  Id. 
at 43-44. 
 The government has not offered any proof of these 
assertions.  If the government wishes to argue that the 
information concerning the use of informants in the 1930's is of 
such a specialized nature that it is still unknown to the public, 
the government must introduce evidence of that fact.  Moreover, 
if the government submits evidence that specific documents it has 
withheld contain secret information about techniques for 
recruiting informants, it will have to establish that the release 
of this information would risk circumvention of the law.  The 
speculation provided in the government's brief of political 
groups' increased ability to detect informants within their ranks 
is not supported by evidence.  Accordingly, on remand, the 
government must provide the district court with additional facts 




 Last, the government asserts that information was 
exempt from disclosure under 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(2), which applies 
to matters pertaining solely to the internal personnel rules and 
practices of an agency.  This exemption pertains to "routine 
matters" of "merely internal significance" in which the public 
lacks any substantial interest.  Department of the Air Force v. 
Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 369-70, 96 S. Ct. 1592, 1603 (1976).  The 
materials claimed to fall within the (b)(2) exemption include the 
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following categories of information: (1) permanent source symbols 
or code names assigned to confidential informants; (2) the file 
numbers of permanent symbol numbered sources, (3) temporary 
source symbols; and (4) administrative data, practices and 
procedures.  App. at 71-74. 
 Agent Moran claimed in his declaration that: 
Information relative to matters of purely 
internal, bureaucratic significance has been 
withheld in certain documents as it pertains 
to the administrative handling of purely 
internal functions and policies of the FBI. 
The information is not of obvious importance 
in itself; but, if it were  released to 
plaintiff and combines with other known data, 
in a "mosaic" analysis, it could lead to 
identification of substantive information in 
the file which has been withheld pursuant to 
other 5 U.S.C. 552 exemptions.  Disclosure of 
this type of information would not add to the 
public's understanding of the inner workings 
of the Government. 
 
Information has also been deleted from a 
sample document which relates to FBIHQ 
instructions to a field office concerning 
agency business.  This material relates to 
procedures and practices to be followed to 
effectively support investigative efforts. 
 
App. at 74. 
 The government argues that informant codes fall within 
the ambit of Exemption (b)(2).  We agree.  As the Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has noted, "[t]he 
means by which the FBI refers to informants in its investigative 
files is a matter of internal significance in which the public 
has no substantial interest."  Lesar v. United States Dep't of 
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Justice, 636 F.2d 472, 485-86 (D.C. Cir. 1980);  see also Massey 
v. FBI, 3 F.3d 620, 622 (2d Cir. 1993). 
 However, the description given by the Moran declaration 
provided the district court with no information as to the content 
of any of the withheld documents or portions of documents. 
Accordingly, on remand, the government may assert exemptions 
under (b)(2) if the district court is provided with sufficient 
factual support for the withholdings. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 Because the Vaughn affidavit submitted by the 
government did not include a specific factual recitation linking 
the documents or portions of documents in question with the 
claimed FOIA exemptions, the district court was not provided with 
an adequate factual basis for its determination.  The order of 
the district court granting summary judgment to the government 
was inappropriate because the government did not sufficiently 
"describe the withheld information and the justification for 
withholding with reasonable specificity, demonstrating a logical 
connection between the information and the claimed exemption[s]." 
American Friends, 831 F.2d at 444 (quoting Abbotts, 766 F.2d at 
606).  Accordingly, we will remand this matter to the district 
court for further fact finding7 and conclusions consistent with 
the principles articulated in this opinion. 
                                                           
7Fact finding may take the form of ordering a more detailed 
supplemental Vaughn index and public affidavits.  See, e.g., 
Wiener, 943 F.2d at 979; King, 830 F.3d at 225; Ferri, 645 F.2d 
at 1225.  If the district court is still concerned that it is 
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unable to make a responsible de novo determination, it may 
proceed with in camera review.  5 U.S.C. § 552 (a)(4)(B).  We 
have discussed elsewhere the factors to be considered in deciding 
whether in camera review is appropriate.  See, e.g., Ferri, 645 
F.2d at 1225-26; Lame I, 654 F.2d at 921-22. 
